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Language tends to be seen primarily as a device for reporting on
the nature of the world around us. This view engenders the default
assumption that linguistic expressions normally refer directly to actual
individuals and actual relationships in which they participate. But to
what extent is this really the case? I suggest that departures from the
direct description of ACTUALITY are ubiquitous and fundamental in
language. Surprisingly much of our linguistic effort goes into the de-
scription of VIRTUAL entities, even when our main concern is with
actual ones. This is so even under a broad interpretation of what
counts as actual. An attempt is made to clarify the actual/virtual dis-
tinction by exploring a variety of phenomena involving the direct de-
scription of virtual entities.
I would like to consider the following position, which is commonly accepted
as a kind of default assumption about language and linguistic expressions:
(1) A COMMON ASSUMPTION: As a device for reporting on the nature
of the world around us, language is used primarily for the direct descrip-
tion of events and situations. The principal nominal and relational ele-
ments of a clause refer specifically to actual individuals and an actual re-
lationship in which they participate.
As it stands, assumption (1) is probably too vague to ever be proven right or
wrong. Nor is it clear that any scholar, on serious reflection, would accept it with-
out extensive qualification. Still, the variety and prevalence of departures from
the direct description of actual relationships and individuals tend, I believe, to be
greatly underestimated. It is essential that we be fully aware of the nature and ex-
tent of such departures if we desire a realistic assessment of language, cognition,
and the mental construction of our world.
I am thus concerned with various kinds of indirectness in the connection
between linguistic expressions and the actual individuals and relationships they
pertain to. Two major sources of such indirectness will be mentioned here just in
passing. The first is IMPLICATURE, where information is obtained indirectly -
via pragmatic inference — from what is explicitly stated. In (2a), for instance,
speaker B's response allows speaker A to infer that B has not in fact finished the
dissertation, although B avoids saying this directly.
(2) a. A: Have you finished your dissertation?
B: Well, I've chosen a topic, [implicature]
b. He hung his father on the wall above the fireplace, [metonymy]
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The second is METONYMY, where the explicit mention of one entity provides a
conceptual REFERENCE POINT serving to evoke the conception of another
(Langacker 1993). In (2b), for example, direct mention of the father serves to
evoke the conception of the father's portrait, which is the intended referent de-
spite being referred to only indirectly. Both implicature and metonymy are ex-
tremely prevalent and contribute greatly to the indirectness of the relation be-
tween linguistic expressions and the situations of concern. f
The formulation in ( 1 ) makes reference to ACTUAL individuals and relation-
ships. My claim is that departures from the direct description of ACTUALITY are
ubiquitous and fundamental in language. Surprisingly much of our linguistic ef-
fort goes into the description of VIRTUAL entities, even when our main concern is
with actual ones. (I will also speak of FICLTVE entities (cf. Talmy 1996). At least
for present purposes, the terms virtual and fictive can be used interchangeably.)
We must therefore begin with a rough characterization of how the notion of ac-
tuality will be understood.
Actuality will be distinguished from notions like 'real world', 'reality', and
'truth'. The actual/virtual contrast can be drawn for any kind of global 'world',
whether it be the 'real world' (the default) or a derivative one, like the imagined
world of a myth or a novel. Sentences (3a) and (3b) are therefore taken as direct
descriptions of actual, albeit mythical, events and individuals. But sentence (3c) is
not. As a generic statement, it makes no direct reference to any specific individual
or event in actuality. Generics are just one type of expression referring to virtual
(as opposed to actual) entities.
(3) a. Adam ate an apple.
[direct description of an actual, though mythical, event]
b. Eve eventually exited Eden.
[direct description of an actual, though mythical, event]
c. Serpents seldom seem sincere.
[generic; no actual individual or event directly described]
Actual and virtual entities are thus distinguished within a particular global
world, as sketched in Figure 1. I find it helpful to use the metaphor of 'planes'
(equivalently, we could speak of 'tiers' or 'mental spaces' (Fauconnier 1985;
1997)). Entities that are not part of actuality are visualized as occupying a
VIRTUAL PLANE, which is distinct from the ACTUAL PLANE despite certain cor-
respondences between them. For instance, the serpents referred to in (3c), as well I
as their infrequent manifestations of sincerity, are located in a virtual plane de-
scribing what the world is like in general (independently of any particular indi-
viduals or events in actuality). There are numerous kinds of departures from actu-
ality, for which distinct planes may have to be posited. I will refer to any of these
as a virtual plane, as well as adopting more specific labels for some of them.
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Figure 1.
In a given world, REALITY can be defined as the history of what has hap-
pened up through the present, as conceptualized by the speaker (Langacker
1991: ch. 6). Reality evolves through time (?), continually 'growing' toward the
future as more and more occurs. The term GROUND (G) refers to the actual speech
event, its participants, and its immediate circumstances. The ground defines the
'present', being located on the 'leading edge' of reality as it grows with the pas-
sage of time. Reality is one facet of actuality, which further includes the 'modal
elaborations' of reality, such as the fact (as seen by the speaker) that certain
events did not occur, or the likelihood of future events occurring. But even when
an actual event is not accepted as real, its reality remains AT ISSUE. In negating a
past event we are denying its inclusion among those constituting reality. A modal
pertains to the likelihood of reality evolving to encompass the event in question.
In either case, the speaker is assessing its status and position vis-a-vis reality.
All the sentences in (4) will thus be regarded as descriptions of actuality:
(4) a. Some unicorns trampled a Martian. [false description of
actuality]
b. She did not recognize him. [actual but non-occurrent event]
c. They might cancel the soccer match, [actual but only potential]
d. Joe believes a unicorn bit me. [direct description of belief
about actuality]
Actuality is taken as being independent of truth and falsity, as well as negation,
tense, and modality. Although the events described in (4a)-(c) are not portrayed
as being real, their possible inclusion in reality is precisely what is at issue. I am
also willing to speak of actuality in regard to the complements of verbs of pro-
positional attitude, e.g., believe, as in (4d). The speaker is of course not asserting
that a unicorn bit him, but is only describing a belief held by Joe. Still, that belief
pertains to actuality (even if it happens to be false), and the subordinate clause
offers a direct description of both the event and its participants.
The distinction between actual and virtual entities should become clearer ;is
we proceed through examples. It is not absolute, and the line might be drawn in
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other places. My strategy here is to interpret actuality rather broadly. I hope to
show that departures from the direct description of actuality are legion, even with
a liberal definition. Though numerous, the types of cases to be considered are
anything but exhaustive.
One of the most basic findings of cognitive linguistics is the utter pervasive-
ness in thought and speech of METAPHOR (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Turner
1987; Lakoff & Turner 1989), as well as CONCEPTUAL BLENDING (Fauconnierj
& Turner 1994; Turner & Fauconnier 1995; Coulson 1996), of which metaphor
constitutes a special case. In metaphor, a SOURCE DOMAIN is evoked as a basis
for conceiving or understanding a TARGET domain. The result of so doing is of-
ten a 'hybrid' (Fong 1988) or BLENDED structure that inherits certain properties
from both the source and the target. Suppose I metaphorically construe a theory
as a building, as in (5). In so doing, I mentally create a hybrid entity that is build-
ing-like in certain basic structural respects (Clausner & Croft 1997), yet somehow
ethereal or non-substantial. If my theory collapses, I may not be very happy, but I
don't have to worry about being struck by a falling beam.
(5) A THEORY IS A BUILDING: You need to buttress that theory. His
theory rests on weak foundations. The framework of the theory is sound.
She demolished my theory. Our theory collapsed under the weight of
counterevidence.
The relation between the planes depicted in Figure 1, on the one hand, and
metaphorical expressions like those in (5), on the other, is as follows. The meta-
phor itself, as a general pattern of conceptual structuring, does not refer to any
particular building or any particular theory, hence it is not part of actuality. It
consists of various mappings, or CORRESPONDENCES (represented by dotted
lines), between the source domain of buildings (or physical structures more gen-
erally — see Grady, Taub, & Morgan 1996; Grady 1997) and the target domain of
theories. The primary mapping, the only one shown in Figure 2, identifies a
building (B) with a theory (T); at this level, of course, the corresponding entities
are types or arbitrary instances, rather than any actual building or theory. Result-
ing from the source-target correspondences is a blend, one element of which is a
hybrid type of entity, given as B/T, combining certain properties of buildings and
theories. The metaphor residing in these mappings supports an open-ended set of
expressions describing the metaphorical construal of theories in general or of par-
ticular theories in actuality.
The sentences in (5) describe actual situations and events involving the
soundness and fate of actual theories. The specific theory being referred to in a
single example is represented in Figure 2 as t\. It is not however i[ per se that is
conceived as being buttressed, having foundations and a framework, being de-
molished, or collapsing— such a conception would be anomalous. Rather, these
relationships are ascribed to an imagined instance of the hybrid entity type B/T,
which renders the conception coherent. This imagined entity b/tj corresponds to
ti but does not exist in actuality. It is the virtual, fanciful correspondent of a real
entity, one that instantiates the metaphor and functions in lieu of the real entity
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for purposes of making the metaphorical predication. This predication is thus a
VIRTUAL structure evoked to describe a facet of REALITY.
Source
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of Metaphor
/Actual
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Figure 2.
The essential point here is that metaphorical expressions commonly (perhaps
always?) describe the blended, virtual structure, even though an actual situation
in the target domain is the one we are ultimately concerned with (Fauconnier
1997: 168-171). Collocations like demolish. ..theory and theory. ..collapse are
conceptually coherent in neither the source domain nor the target domain, con-
sidered individually. Only in the blended structure where a theory assumes cer-
tain building-like properties can such expressions be assembled without semantic
incompatibility. We are therefore talking about theories per se only INDIRECTLY
— it is the BLEND that these metaphorical expressions refer to DIRECTLY. Only
via and in relation to what is said about the blended structure do we draw the in-
tended conclusions about the actual situation in the target domain of theories and
their assessment. The blended structure is a kind of virtual representation created
in order to indirectly specify something concerning the actual situation of con-
cern.
Many of the phenomena discussed subsequently could also be character-
ized in terms of metaphor and blending. I will not explicitly present them in that
fashion, simply because I want to focus on their virtual nature and the often un-
noticed indirectness in what seem like straightforward descriptions of actuality.
Still, the ubiquity of metaphor and conceptual blending is already sufficient to
show the simplistic nature of the assumption in ( 1).
Perhaps the most obvious case of non-actuality is VIRTUAL MOTION. Under
the alternative labels ABSTRACT MOTION, SUBJECTIVE MOTION, and FICTIVE
MOTION, it has been studied extensively by cognitive linguists (Langacker 1986;
Matsumoto 1996a; 1996b; 1997; Talmy 1996). Talmy lists quite a number of sub-
types, some of which are exemplified in (6).
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(6) a. That mountain range goes from Mexico to Canada.
b. The signpost points toward the town.
c. The sun is shining into the cave.
d. The pillar cast a shadow against the wall.
e. We can be seen by the enemy from where they're positioned.
f. I sat in the car and watched the scenery rush past me.
g. As I painted, a line of paint spots slowly progressed across the |
floor.
h. The palm trees cluster together around the oasis,
i. Termite mounds are scattered all over the plain,
j. The bakery is across the street from the bank.
Consider expressions like (6a). The motion verb go and prepositional
phrases with from and to are of the sort that would normally be used for an object
moving along an extended spatial path through time. Here, however, nothing ac-
tually moves. The mountain range is static, despite occurring as the subject of go,
and no explicit mention is made of any potential mover. In Talmy's terms, there is
FICTIVE motion but the FACTIVE situation is one of stasis.
This can be described in various ways. It might be argued that the mountain
range is construed metaphorically as moving along a path. Alternatively, one
might posit an imaginary mover who traverses a path along the mountain range's
expanse. I myself have said that the CONCEPTUALIZER moves SUBJECTIVELY
along this path by a process of MENTAL SCANNING. These descriptions are not
necessarily incompatible. I believe that all of the factors mentioned are involved,
probably to varying degrees in different examples. Metaphorical motion by the
subject seems more evident with a different choice of verb, as in (7a). The role of
an imagined mover becomes more evident with a different choice of subject, or
with other adjustments, as in (7b)-(c). In cases like (7d), both the subject
(metaphorically) and another mover traverse the same path. Note further that in
all these circumstances the conceptualizer scans mentally along the spatial path in
question. In conceiving of some entity moving along a path, the conceptualizer
necessarily evokes in sequence the various locations constituting that path, and
in so doing moves subjectively along it.
(7) a. That mountain range {reaches/extends/stretches} from Mexico to
Canada.
b. This highway goes from Mexico to Canada.
I
c. The freeway ran along the coast for a while, then entered the
mountains.
d. This road {leads/takes} you directly to the exit — you just have to
follow it.
As seen in Figure 3, the conceptual characterization of (6a) has both an ac-
tual and a virtual component. In actuality, it PROFILES (i.e., designates) the con-
tinuation through time of a stable situation in which the TRAJECTOR (tr), the en-
tity coded by the subject, has a spatial extension reaching from Mexico (M) at
one extreme to Canada (C) at the other. Enclosed in a box, the profiled relation-
Langacker: Virtual reality 83
ship continues through a span of time (indicated by a bar along the time arrow)
not conceived as being bounded. This unbounded character makes the profiled
relationship 1MPERFECTIVE (or 'stative'), which enables it to be expressed in the
simple present tense (goes), even though go as a true motion verb is PERFECTIVE
and thus requires the progressive for a present-time event (Langacker 1987).
Figure 3.
Hence the situation in actuality determines the basic aspectual categoriza-
tion of the profiled relationship, with predictable consequences for its
tense/aspect marking. Yet virtual motion is also essential to the meaning of (6a); if
nothing else, it provides the directionality coded by the prepositional phrases
from Mexico and to Canada. But what is virtual motion? In Figure 3 I have
shown it as subjective motion (mental scanning) on the part of the conceptual-
izer. The arrow labeled T stands for PROCESSING TIME, i.e., time as the MEDIUM
of conceptualization (whereas CONCEIVED TIME, t, is time as the OBJECT of con-
ceptualization). Through a span of processing time, the conceptualizer builds up
to a full conception of the profiled relation by mentally scanning along a path and
progressively superimposing all the locations scanned until the full configuration
is simultaneously available as a single gestalt (I refer to this as SUMMARY
SCANNING). The circles represent the conceptualizer' s momentary focus of at-
tention at a given instant, and each focused location brings an additional segment
of the trajector (or its spatial extension) into awareness. Observe that the full con-
figuration accessed via this virtual, subjective motion is identified with the single,
static configuration in actuality whose continuation through time constitutes the
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profiled clausal relationship. The virtual motion, with its dynamicity and inherent
directionality, is used to 'build up' the conception of a stable situation. It is this
virtual motion, rather than the static situation in actuality, which motivates the use
of go as well as the path prepositions from and to.
As noted earlier, the subjective movement just described is compatible with
the other ways of interpreting virtual motion, and in fact is immanent in both of
them, representing their abstract commonality. Suppose, on the one hand, that i
(6a) — or another example, like (7b) — is construed in terms of some imagined
individual moving objectively (though fictively) along the spatial path in ques-
tion. Under this interpretation, the circles in Figure 3 can be taken as representing
the mover, who successively occupies all the points along the trajector's expanse.
(This motion would of course occur through a span of conceived time, but a fic-
tive span of time, not the actual time span through which the profiled relationship
is tracked in the actual plane.) Yet, in conceiving of this motion the conceptual-
izer is inherently directing attention to successive portions of the spatial path,
which can thus be summarized to yield the gestalt conception of the full configu-
ration, as before. The notion of an individual moving along the path can be pres-
ent with varying degrees of cognitive salience. 'Pure' subjective motion as previ-
ously described can be regarded as the limiting case in which this notion fades
away entirely, leaving the conceptualizer's mental scanning as its only vestige.
On the other hand, suppose (6a) — or perhaps (7a) — is construed in terms
of metaphorical motion on the part of the subject. In this case, the virtual plane in
Figure 3 can be interpreted as instantiating the blend resulting from the meta-
phorical mapping (cf. Figure 2). The source domain of the metaphor is the con-
ception of something moving along a spatial path, and its target domain is the
conception of a spatially extended object (like a mountain range or a road). Cor-
respondences link the mover, at each instant in its motion along the path, with
successive portions of the extended object. The blend that results involves that
object moving— or in a summary view, 'growing' — along the spatial path, just
as shown in Figure 3.
The different kinds of fictive motion illustrated in (6) all deserve comparable
scrutiny, but we need to move on. Virtual motion turns out to be just a special
case of the much broader phenomenon of VIRTUAL CHANGE. One kind of vir-
tual change, apparently quite prevalent in Japanese, has been described by Mat-
sumoto 1996c. In contrast to (8), which describes the room's shape directly, (9)
does so indirectly, by portraying it as the result of a change. '
(8) Sono heya wa marui.
the room T round
'The room is round.'
(9) Sono heya wa maruku na-tte iru.
the room T round become-STAT be.
'The room is [in the state of having become] round.'
No change has actually occurred in (9). Instead, this resultant state construction
describes the departure of the actual situation, where the room is round, from the
Langacker: Virtual reality 85
ideal or canonical situation, in which a room is rectangular. A fictive event is in-
voked for purposes of characterizing a static situation in actuality.
Of course, a sentence like (9) is really ambiguous. It could in principle de-
scribe the stable situation resulting from the room actually changing shape, from
being rectangular to being round. More likely it simply means that the room is
round, without implying any change, but in contrast to (8) it nonetheless portrays
that situation as a departure from the normal or expected one. The ambiguity can
be explicated as a matter of whether the change-of-state process (that of becom-
ing round, in this case) is construed as being actual or virtual.
Figure 4.
A change-of-state process is depicted abstractly in the top portion of Figure
4. A circle represents the thing that undergoes the change of state (e.g., a room).
The change in state, which can be thought of as a property progressively mani-
festing itself through time, is represented by a line increasing in length until it fully
traverses the circle. The final state of this process — the resultant state in which
the property is fully manifest— is identified as the situation in actuality that sen-
tence (9) designates. More precisely, the sentence as a whole profiles the imper-
fective process wherein this stable situation is followed sequentially in its con-
tinuation through time. But if this static situation obtains in actuality, what about
the change-of-state process that produces it? No indication is made in the dia-
gram as to whether this process is construed as being actual or virtual. That is
where the ambiguity lies. On the one hand, this change can be situated in the ac-
tual plane, occupying a span of time prior to that of the profiled imperfective
process. This implies that the room really did undergo a change in shape. On the
other hand, the change can be a virtual one, invoked to contrast the profiled con-
figuration with the canonical one.
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Another kind of virtual change, described by Talmy 1996 and Sweetser
1997, is exemplified in (10).
(10) a. His newspaper column grew longer every week.
b. The trees got shorter at higher altitudes.
c. The water got deeper as he swam away from the shore.
Sweetser has noted that the interpretation of expressions like these hinges on a
whether a nominal expression is construed as referring to a general ROLE oral
specific VALUE of that role (in the sense of Fauconnier 1985). At least in this con-
text, values can be identified with actual individuals (or sets of individuals). The
individual interpretations are possible in (10) but highly implausible in view of
general world knowledge. On the individual reading, his newspaper column in
(10a) refers to a specific piece of prose that took a long time to finish and was
augmented on a weekly basis. In (10b), we can imagine a particular set of trees
being transported up the side of a mountain, each one shrinking as it went (for
some unexplained reason). If (10c) is taken as describing an actual change (rather
than a virtual one), the entire body of water increased in depth (perhaps floodwa-
ters were rushing into a small lake).
More likely, of course, is the role interpretation, where the change described
is Active, or virtual, rather than actual. On this construal, his newspaper column
does not refer to any actual piece of prose, but rather to an abstract entity — a
role — which particular pieces of prose instantiated on particular occasions. No
actual column is portrayed as changing in length. Instead, the appearance of
change comes about when successive instantiations of the column are compared
and observed to differ in length in a way analogous to that of a single piece of
prose sampled at different times while being revised and expanded. The change is
thus virtual in the sense of emerging from the comparison of different individuals
AS IF they were a single individual observed at different times. Similarly, the trees
in (10b) does not refer to any specific set of woody plants. It is a role description,
referring to an aspect of the landscape observable at any given altitude. The vir-
tual change in height is obtained by comparing different values or instantiations
of this role. And in (10c), there need be no change at all in the overall body of wa-
ter or its depth at any one location. Rather, the water is a role description refer-
ring to the local expanse of water surrounding the swimmer at any given moment.
As the swimmer moves, this role is successively instantiated by distinct expanses
of water, whose different depths can be perceived as virtual change.
This kind of virtual change is sketched in Figure 5. R stands for a role con-
ception, which of course is a virtual entity rather than an actual individual. The
individuals that fill this role at different points in time are given as vi, V2, and V3.
In the actual situation being described, each such individual, at the time in ques-
tion, participates in a certain relationship (shown abstractly as a line connecting it
to another entity), e.g., it falls at a certain point on a scale of length, height, or
depth. These individual relationships in the actual plain fail to constitute a coher-
ent process of the sort profiled by a clause — where a single relationship, with the
same set of participants, is tracked in its evolution through time. Instead there are
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different participants at each moment, and it is not the case that one relationship
evolves into the next. A coherent process conception emerges only in the virtual
plane. It emerges when the actual individuals (vj, V2, and V3), observed at differ-
ent points in time, are fictively viewed as if they were the same individual, vi. Be-
cause they involve the 'same' participant, one relationship is then seen as evolv-
ing into the next, so that the participant is conceived as changing through time.
The clause profiles this virtual change.
Figure 5.
Note that Figure 5 differs from Figures 3 and 4 in regard to the locus of the
PROFILED process, i.e., the relationship that is 'put on stage' and specifically
designated by the clause. In these previous diagrams, the status of profile was
conferred on an imperfective process in the actual plane. By contrast, in Figure 5
profiling falls on a fictive event in the virtual plane. It is only in the virtual plane
that a coherent process emerges at all to be profiled. We will see that the profiling
of virtual entities is in fact quite common.
The type of virtual change depicted in Figure 5 tends to be closely associ-
ated with actual or virtual motion and the sensory impressions induced in the
moving viewer. In (10c), an actual mover is explicitly mentioned. What counts as
the water is the expanse of water around the mover at a given moment, and since
different patches of water can vary in depth, the viewer's actual motion induces
the impression that its depth is changing. In (10b) no actual mover is mentioned,
but on a non-generic interpretation one is strongly implied. The trees refers to a
local feature of the landscape observable at any given point in a tacit journey
from lower to higher altitudes. An imagined moving viewer seems to be as impor-
tant in such examples of virtual change as it is in cases of virtual motion like (7b)-
(c).
8 8 Studies in the Linguistic Sciences 29:2 (Fall 1999)
I would go further and say that the conceptualizations evoked as the
meanings of linguistic expressions always presuppose a VIEWER (i.e., a concep-
tualize^ and a VIEWING ARRANGEMENT (Langacker 1995). The viewing ar-
rangement comprises such factors as a VANTAGE POINT, the DOMAIN being
viewed (e.g., a 'world' or mental space), and how that domain is MENTALLY
ACCESSED. Although the viewing arrangement is only implicit, it provides the
foundation for apprehending a given situation. It thereby exerts a strong shaping I
influence on both the conceptualization and the form of the expression that en-
codes it.
In the default viewing arrangement, the viewer is the actual speaker (and
secondarily, the addressee), the domain is the real world, and the viewer — from a
fixed vantage point — describes events and situations in actuality. This canonical
arrangement is presupposed in assumption (1). There are, however, many kinds of
departure from this canon. Expressions do not necessarily pertain to the real
world, nor to actuality within a given world. A vantage point can be adopted
other than the speaker's actual one, and domains can be accessed in varied and
complex ways.
It should be evident that some of the cases already discussed can be charac-
terized as involving a FICITVE (or VIRTUAL) VIEWING ARRANGEMENT. A fre-
quent pattern, grounded in our experience as travelers, is for a moving viewer to
describe what he sees AS IF he were static (as in the canonical arrangement). This
produces the type of fictive motion exemplified in (1 1):
(11) The telephone poles are rushing by at 80 miles per hour.
Here the speaker is reporting on his actual viewing experience at the moment of
speaking. However, he does so with respect to a virtual viewing arrangement in
which the speaker is static and the telephone poles are moving, when presumably
just the opposite is really the case. In other words, the sentence directly encodes
(and reflects in its form) the actual experience engendered by a fictive construal
of the speaker's viewing circumstances.
Slightly different is another classic example cited by Talmy 1988:
(12) a. There was a house every now and then through the valley,
b. There is a house every now and then through the valley.
I have varied the tense to bring out two subtly different construals. But with ei-
ther tense, the sentence looks like it ought to be semantically and grammatically f
incoherent. It uses the adverbial phrase every now and then with respect to the
existence of a house, but a house is not something whose existence flashes on
and off like a light bulb. The adverb through the valley is even more problematic,
since it describes a spatial path, but nothing overtly specified in the sentence is
conceived or portrayed as moving.
Yet the expressions are immediately and unproblematically understood.
They merely presuppose a non-standard viewing arrangement involving a mov-
ing viewer, and describe the viewing experience thereby engendered. At a given
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moment a person's field of view subtends only a circumscribed portion of the sur-
rounding world, and as a person travels along a spatial path, the field of view
moves along with him, subtending a different portion of the world at each mo-
ment. From the vantage point of a moving viewer, the existence of a house within
the portion of the world currently being viewed is something that happens every
now and then. Likewise, the adverb through the valley describes the path of the
viewer (and the field of view), rather than anything explicitly mentioned. The se-
mantic and grammatical coherence of these expressions is critically dependent on
a viewer and viewing arrangement that are not directly mentioned.
Sentence (12a), with past tense, favors the construal in which the viewing
experience was that of the actual speaker, on a prior journey. Its virtuality is lim-
ited to the fact that it describes the speaker's visual impressions (what appeared
in the field of view, at what intervals) rather than describing the valley directly
and objectively, in its own terms. By contrast, (12b), with present tense, favors a
quasi-generic construal not based on any particular journey or any specific
viewer. In generalized terms it describes what the valley is like, but it nevertheless
does so from the perspective of a viewer traversing it. That viewer is simply not
identified with any specific or actual individual. The viewer, the viewing experi-
ence, and the journey are virtual rather than actual.
Previous examples of fictive motion and fictive change were also seen as
evoking an actual or virtual moving viewer. In (10), for instance, the past tense
favored an interpretation involving an actual viewer. Once again, shifting to pres-
ent tense induces a quasi-generic construal involving a generalized, virtual
viewer, coded by you in ( 1 3a) but implicit in ( 1 3b):
(13) a. The water gets deeper as you swim away from the shore,
b. The trees get shorter at higher altitudes.
These sentences describe an actual situation as it would present itself to any
moving viewer at any time. The motion, the viewing, and the change they engen-
der are all virtual, yet they provide a way of mentally accessing a facet of reality.
Once we depart from actual motion by an actual viewer, we are no longer
tied to the spatial domain and the perception of physical entities. Many kinds of
expressions appear to invoke a tacit virtual viewer whose movement through
time or some other abstract domain provides a way of mentally accessing it. Al-
though we cannot examine them here, the examples in (14) may hint at their
range and variety. (For still and already, see Michaelis 1991; 1993; 1996.)
(14) a. The years are going by awfully fast. [cf. (11)]
b. From moment to moment the crowd became more restless.
c. His condition progressively worsened from one day to the next.
d. Prices vary greatly from one restaurant to the next.
e. Quality improves in the higher price ranges.
f. As body size increases, the typical gestation period gets longer.
g. Through the ages there have been many great leaders.
h. Going down the list, every conceivable option seems worse than
the last.
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i. Don't mention calculus— elementary algebra is already too
advanced for him.
j. He's not as bad as Gingrich, but Helms is still way too liberal for
me.
We have so far observed fictivity with respect to both the situation de-
scribed and the implicit way of viewing it. In a more speculative vein, I suggest
that we might also posit VIRTUAL SPEECH ACTS, i.e., fictivity at the level of illo- 4
cutionary force. I characterize a conventional speech-act value as residing in a
SCHEMATIZED INTERACTIVE FRAME, abstracted from specific speech events in
the same way as any other kind of linguistic unit. These frames make schematic
reference to the speaker and hearer, to an utterance, to relevant facets of the con-
text, and to such factors as the intent of the interlocutors and the assessment of
each interlocutor concerning the intent and previous knowledge of the other. For
example, the frame for assertion embraces such notions as the speaker's intent to
establish a proposition in a certain mental space (in particular, some conception of
reality), canonically for the purpose of inducing the hearer to accept it as part of
that space. A substantial inventory of conventional frames are presumably avail-
able for speakers to use in actual discourse. When such a frame is used, an appro-
priate clause is plugged into it and the whole complex is activated in the context
of the actual speech situation. Aspects of the situation thus instantiate the frame's
schematic specifications (e.g., the actual speaker and hearer instantiate the sche-
matic roles of speaker and hearer).
In a fictive speech act, the speaker in some sense pretends to employ the in-
teractive frame but does not fully identify its elements with those of the actual in-
teraction constituting the ground. Instead, the entire complex (frame plus clause)
is embedded in another interactive frame that IS identified with the ground and
specifies the actual nature of the intended interaction. We often do this for irony,
as in (15):
(15) a. That was a brilliant move, [in response to something obviously
stupid]
b. He will finish his dissertation on time. And I will be elected pope.
Here the speaker only pretends to make an assertion. By making its content the
opposite of what is manifestly true, or coordinating it with another apparent as-
sertion that is blatantly false, he signals that his actual intent is not to induce the
hearer to accept the proposition as true, but merely to put it on stage for examina- f
tion. The supposition, of course, is that its patent falsity will make it evident how"
silly it would be to even consider asserting it in actuality. The examples in (16)
illustrate another familiar pattern:
(16) a. Who needs that car? [= 'Nobody needs that car.']
b. Why should he tell the truth? [= 'He has no reason to tell the
truth.']
Here the speaker only pretends to ask a question. The actual interactive intent is
not to elicit an answer from the hearer, but to render evident the impossibility of
providing a truthful answer that satisfies the question's existential presupposi-
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tion. A virtual act of questioning is incorporated as part of a higher-level interac-
tive frame with a different projected outcome. The relation between the expres-
sion and the actual interaction envisaged is only indirect.
A basic point emerging from the discussion thus far is that an expression's
overt content — what it directly and explicitly mentions — is only one facet of
the elaborate conceptualization that constitutes its meaning. The overtly men-
tioned elements are apprehended in terms of an implicit viewing arrangement, and
this entire conceptual complex is embedded in a tacit interactive frame. These im-
plicit layers of conceptualization are essential ingredients of an expression's se-
mantic value and play a major role in shaping its form. Moreover, structures at any
level — content, viewing arrangement, interaction — can be virtual rather than
actual.
I would next like to consider the English present tense. Elsewhere (1987:
82) I have argued for the following, 'naive' characterization of the English pres-
ent:
(17) PRESENT TENSE: A full instantiation of the profiled process occurs
and precisely coincides with the time of speaking.
I still believe that characterization to be valid. However, it does require a certain
amount of clarification and reinterpretation (which various discussions with
Mariko Higuchi Goto have helped me arrive at). It turns out that virtual entities
are crucial to understanding the English present tense.
It is a truism of modern linguistics that the English 'present' is not a real pre-
sent tense marker in the sense of indicating that an event occurs right now, at the
time of speaking. Two considerations make this seem quite evident. First, the sim-
ple present cannot be used for perfective verbs; to indicate the occurrence right
now of a perfective process, the progressive has to be employed:
(18) a. *She does her homework right now.
b. She is doing her homework right now.
Second, the present is commonly used for events that do not occur at the moment
of speaking. Some representative cases are the 'scheduled future', 'stage direc-
tions', and 'timeless' statements of general validity:
(19) a. Our plane leaves at noon.
b. Hamlet moves to center stage. He pulls out his dagger. He ex-
amines it.
c. A wombat is a marsupial.
I suggest, however, that this truism is in fact false, and that the naive characteriza-
tion — properly understood — is the correct one.
It should first be noted that the naive characterization provides an explana-
tion for why present tense perfectives are normally bad. A perfective process is
bounded, and a full instantiation of such a process includes its endpoints, i.e., the
profded relationship is tracked from beginning to end in its evolution through
time. Thus, for a perfective process to precisely coincide with the time of speak-
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ing, its initiation has to coincide with the onset of the speech event, and their
completion must also be coincident. This poses both a DURATIONAL problem and
an EPISTEMIC one. The durational problem is that there is no inherent connection
between the length of the event described and the length of the speech event de-
scribing it, e.g., it takes longer to do one's homework than to utter (18)(a). The
epistemic problem is that one has to observe an event in order to identify it as a
prerequisite to describing it. But by the time an event is observed and identified, it t
is already too late to initiate a speech event that precisely coincides with it. These
"
problems do not arise with present-tense imperfectives, since imperfectives
(including progressives) are 'mass-like', so that any portion of the overall process
counts as a full instantiation of the process type. So given an ongoing, already
identified imperfective process, that portion of it which coincides with the time of
speaking counts as valid instance, as required by (17).
These characterizations are sketched in Figure 6(a)-(b). Observe that the
present-tense perfective configuration is conceptually coherent. The problem
with present-tense perfectives is simply that, owing to the durational and epis-
temic problems, this configuration normally cannot arise.
(a) Present Perfective (b) Present Imperfective (c) Performative
E=l
Speech
Event
wm
Speech
Event
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arrangement, the event's virtual occurrence DOES coincide with the time of
speaking.
Consider first the use of the present in play-by-play descriptions of sporting
events and the like, as in (21):
(21) Jordan passes to Pippin. He pulls up and shoots. The ball rims out.
Rodman grabs the rebound.
The clauses are perfective and are employed for the description of actual events,
as they occur. In using the present tense, the announcer purports to be describing
each event coincident with its occurrence. Now we know that, in the strictest
sense, the events and their description cannot coincide exactly, owing to the
durational and epistemic problems already discussed. I suggest, however, that the
conventions of the play-by-play mode of speech include the FICTION of simulta-
neous description. We construe the descriptive statements in terms of a virtual
viewing arrangement such that the announcer can indeed make them coincide
with the profiled events. It just happens that the kinds of events reported have
approximately the right duration for the fiction of exact coincidence to seem
plausible. Moreover, owing to anticipation as well as the stereotyped nature of
sporting events, the time-lag in reporting them may in fact be quite short. The
events are actual, but the viewing reflected in their linguistic encoding contains
an element of fictivity.
When we turn to other kinds of examples, involving other virtual viewing
arrangements, the events themselves have a fictive character. My basic proposal
is that the expressions in question relate only indirectly to actuality, even in cases
like (19a), Our plane leaves at noon, describing the specific departure of a spe-
cific plane. I suggest that what the sentence directly describes is not the actual
event per se, but rather a REPRESENTATION of that event on some kind of
VIRTUAL SCHEDULE, some kind of plan or projection concerning the anticipated
occurrence and timing of events in future actuality. To support the notion that
something like a schedule is involved, we can observe that the 'scheduled future"
strongly favors the inclusion of a time expression, and is infelicitous for events
not amenable to scheduling or planning:
(22) a. My sister arrives next week.
b. ??My sister arrives.
c. ??An earthquake strikes in a month.
Moreover, in some instances the speaker may be alluding to an actual schedule,
perhaps embodied physically:
(23) See, there it is on the screen — our plane leaves at noon from gate 74.
It is nonetheless the virtual schedule, a mental representation of anticipated
events and their timing, that is crucial for the scheduled future.
Although a virtual schedule pertains to future actuality, its own status and
temporal location are another matter. If a plan is in effect, the schedule itself is
stable and mentally accessible through an indefinite span of time that includes the
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present. The schedule contains VIRTUAL EVENTS, which are representations of
anticipated actual events. Moreover, the span of time through which each virtual
event is conceived as unfolding is identified with a particular time in future actu-
ality, as shown in Figure 7. But the events CONSTITUTING the schedule are only
virtual.
Figure 7.
The virtual schedule can be thought of metaphorically as a 'document'
available to be 'read' at any time. In producing a sentence like (22a), the speaker
is essentially reading off one of its entries. Reading an entry amounts to the
VIRTUAL OCCURRENCE of the event it comprises, and since that event is pro-
filed by the sentence produced, a (virtual) occurrence of the profiled process pre-
cisely coincides with the time of speaking. Use of the present tense thus conforms
to the characterization in (17), provided that one takes into account the special
viewing arrangement in which the speaker is 'reading' aloud from a virtual
schedule. In that context, where all the events are virtual, they occur in the sense
of being read, and the reading is necessarily coincident with the speech event.
Note that the durational and epistemic problems do not arise in this context.
The event's occurrence is only virtual, a matter of the conceptualizer mentally
running through it in reading the schedule, so its mental duration can always be
made to coincide with the time of speaking. The speaker can also scan the sched-
ule and examine an entry before reading it aloud, thus avoiding the epistemic
problem. In fact, the durational and epistemic problems are not intrinsic to present
tense or perfectives per se, but can rather be seen as inhering in the default-case
viewing arrangement. They arise in the canonical arrangement where the speaker
is reporting on real events as they actually occur. In this situation, an event's du-
ration is the duration of its actual occurrence; it is thus determined by its inherent
nature and is usually not subject to speaker control. Likewise, since the speaker is
merely reporting, not running the show, he has to observe an event in order to
identify and then describe it, hence the epistemic problem. In other viewing ar-
rangements, especially involving the virtual plane, the duration and unpredict-
ability of real-world events may be irrelevant.
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A performative does describe a real event with a specific duration, but due
to its special properties — identification with the speech event, and the speaker's
intentionality — it inherently avoids the durational and epistemic problems. We
can also imagine other viewing arrangements where actual events are being re-
ported as they occur but the problems fail to come up because the speaker con-
trols their choice and duration. Suppose two children are playing with toy cars in
a model village. One child enacts certain events and describes them as she does
so. Thus, even though she is pretending, the enactments themselves are actual
physical occurrences. In this context the following is perfectly acceptable:
(24) I drive to work. Now I drive to the store. Now I drive home.
With each sentence, the girl pushes her car along the path indicated. Each actual
event temporally coincides with the speech event describing it. The present tense
is applicable because, in this special situation, the speaker knows what event she
intends to make happen and controls the duration of its actual occurrence.
I believe that numerous 'special' uses of the present tense in English pre-
suppose non-standard viewing arrangements involving the virtual occurrence of
events. This is perhaps most obvious in the case of stage directions, as in (19b)
[Hamlet moves to center stage. He pulls out his dagger. He examines it.]. Here
there is very likely to be a physical document, the play's script, that is literally
being read. It is nonetheless the virtual document, comprising a sequence of vir-
tual events, that is crucial. This virtual document is available for reading at any
time, and when it is read, each event in turn enjoys a virtual occurrence residing in
the reader's apprehension of the sentence describing it. We can even go one step
further by observing that an author, in writing a play, is drafting the stage direc-
tions for a VIRTUAL READER (as opposed to any actual one).
What about 'timeless' statements, like (19c) [A wombat is a marsupial]!
Akin to generics, such expressions are not direct descriptions of actual events or
situations. No particular wombat, nor any particular marsupial, is being referred to.
Perhaps we can think metaphorically in terms of a document listing supposed
eternal truths or scientific findings about the world's general nature (as opposed
to specific events occurring within that framework). In any case, we can plausibly
regard the profiled relationships as being inscribed on some kind of virtual docu-
ment describing what the world is like in general. The present tense reflects the
virtual reading of inscriptions, hence the virtual occurrence of the designated
processes coincident with the time of speaking.
The relationships profiled by such expressions inhabit what I will call the
STRUCTURAL PLANE. This term is inspired by Goldsmith & Woisetschlaeger
1982, who distinguish between 'structural' and 'phenomenal' knowledge: '...
The "structural/phenomenal" distinction. ..corresponds to two rather different
types of knowledge about the world...One may describe the world in either of
two ways: by describing what things happen in the world, or by describing how
the world is made that such things may happen in it' (80). Structural knowledge
is general knowledge about how the world 'works', whereas phenomenal
knowledge pertains to the specifics of what actually happens within that stable
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framework. Their structural/phenomenal distinction corresponds to the one made
here between the structural and actual planes.
That brings us to generic expressions, our initial brush with virtuality (recall
(3c)). There are various kinds of generic expressions, whose properties are quite
significantly different — I am not at all sure they constitute a coherent natural
class. Since I have discussed them at some length elsewere (1996b; 1997), I will
briefly consider just a single type, namely a singular generic, such as (25): §
(25) A cat plays with a mouse it has caught.
Obviously, no actual cat is being referred to, nor any actual mouse. The
nominals in (25) designate VIRTUAL INSTANCES of the cat and mouse catego-
ries, i.e., instances 'conjured up' just for the purpose of making a general state-
ment about the world's structure. (In other works I have used the term AR-
BITRARY INSTANCE for what may be the same notion.) The act of playing with a
mouse profiled in (25) is also a virtual instance of that process type. Since the
structural plane is a representation of general and stable aspects of the world's
structure, a process represented there projects to indefinitely many actual occur-
rences that instantiate it, involving particular times, places, and participants. This is
sketched in Figure 8 (the LANDMARK, labeled Im, is the participant coded by the
object in a relational expression). But what a generic sentence profiles (and thus
directly describes) is a virtual event in the structural plane. The profiled process is
an entry in a virtual document available to be read at any time. It does pertain to
actuality, but only indirectly, via the relationship that the structural plane bears to
the actual one.
Figure 8.
In effect, the virtual event profiled in Figure 8 functions as a TYPE
SPECIFICATION capturing what is common to an open-ended set of instantia-
tions in actuality. More generally, a TYPE (as opposed to an INSTANCE of a type)
is a kind of virtual entity, whether it occupies the structural plane — and thus de-
scribes a stable aspect of the world — or is instead created to make a local gener-
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alization about what happens within that framework. Although the type/instance
distinction is not absolute, and involves numerous subtleties that we cannot ex-
plore here (see Langacker 1991: 2.2), it should be evident that a type per se does
not belong to actuality. We can think of a type specification as the abstracted
commonality of its instances. As such it lies outside the actual plane, where multi-
ple instances may occur that are distinguished from one another by their spatio-
temporal location. Any number of such instances can project to the same type
specification, which I will characterize as belonging to a TYPE PLANE, as shown
in Figure 9.
Figure 9.
When used by itself, without any kind of determiner, a noun stem merely
specifies a type. An example is a noun like cat, used alone as the first element of a
compound such as cat-lover. Thus no specific cat is singled out in (26a), nor is
there any indication of how many cats might be involved. In such cases the noun
profiles the virtual entity represented in the type plane.
(26) a. Jenny is a CAT-lover.
b. Jenny loves THIS CAT.
On the other hand, a full noun phrase with a determiner profiles an instance of the
type specified by the head noun. In (26b), this cat profiles a particular instantia-
tion of cat in the actual plane (e.g., tj in Figure 9). We have seen previously that
either actual or virtual entities can be profiled.
Importantly, however, not all instances of a type are actual instances — we
also have to posit virtual (or arbitrary) instances. For example, a singular generic
like (25), A cat plays with a mouse it has caught, designates virtual instances of
the cat and mouse types. As shown in Figure 8, these instances are 'conjured up'
as part of an entry in a virtual document describing a facet of the world's struc-
ture. Given the purpose of this virtual document, these instances in the structural
plane project to an indefinite number of instances in the actual plane. Further-
more, an actual instance of a type can be incorporated as part of some other type
description. For example, habitual sentences like (27) are structural statements in-
directly describing the multiple instantiation of a process type characterized in
terms of specific individuals (my cat and that bird). Since events in the structural
plane are generalizations pertaining to actuality, when appropriate they can in-
corporate reference to actual individuals.
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(27) My cat stalks that bird every morning.
It is not generally realized how frequently we refer to types rather than in-
dividuals, even in expressions clearly intended as pertaining to actuality. We can
see this in the contrast between (28a) and (b), which can perfectly well be used to
describe precisely same sequence of actual events.
(28) a. Three times, students asked dumb questions,
b. Three times, a student asked a dumb question.
They can both be used, for example, if there were exactly three actual events of
questioning, each involving a single student (a different one each time) and a sin-
gle question (also different each time).
The first sentence is a fairly direct description of actuality. It profiles a com-
plex process comprising three actual instances of the process type STUDENT ASK
DUMB QUESTION. Since multiple students and multiple questions are involved,
the subject and object are plural. By contrast, (28b) is used to describe actuality
but refers to it only indirectly. Observe that the clausal portion, a student asked a
dumb question, occurs with a singular subject and object, even though three stu-
dents and three questions are assumed to be involved. It therefore does not di-
rectly refer to the actual event sequence. Rather, as shown in Figure 10, it profdes
the process type A STUDENT ASKED A DUMB QUESTION, which all three actual
events instantiate. The student and question are instances of their respective
thing types (since they are expressed by full noun phrases, with determiners), but
only virtual instances that are conjured up for purposes of specifying a type of
process. In effect, therefore, a two-step strategy is employed to convey informa-
tion about what transpired in the actual plane: the clause itself describes a virtual
process, functioning as a type description, and the adverb three times specifies its
mapping into actuality (how often it was actually instantiated).
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A similar constrast is observed in (29):
(29) a. The witnesses all raised their right hands,
b. The witnesses all raised their right hand.
Both sentences can be interpreted as describing a complex event in which each
witness raised his own right hand. Sentence (29a) directly describes this complex
event in actuality, in the manner of (28a). Hence the subject, possessor, and direct
object all occur in the plural. The subject and the (coreferential) possessor are also
plural in (29b), but the object is singular (right hand), even though multiple hands
are involved. I take this as illustrating a little noted but very common situation: it
frequently happens that portions of a clause directly describe the actual plane
while other portions describe it only indirectly, by naming a type specification in-
stantiated in actuality (these portions can even be intermingled — see Langacker
1996a). In (29b), most of the clause lexicalizes the complex event in the actual
plane, but right hand ascends to the type level and codes something common to
the component events.
This phenomenon is important for the understanding of quantifiers and
quantifier scope. For example, (30a) is ambiguous. It may be the simple, direct de-
scription of an actual event in which the three boys collectively lifted a single
chair, so that only one instance of lifting occurred. But it could also describe a
complex occurrence in which each boy individually lifted a different chair. On
this latter interpretation, the predicate encodes the type specification X LIFTED A
CHAIR, whereas the subject refers directly to three actual boys, each of whom
carries out an instance of that process type. Observe that no specific chair is men-
tioned — the object nominal a chair designates a virtual instance of the category,
conjured up just to make a type specification. Though it corresponds to several
chairs in actuality, this virtual chair itself is only found in the type plane.
(30) a. The three boys lifted a chair,
b. Three boys lifted two chairs.
The characterization of QUANTIFIER SCOPE is now straightforward. Con-
sider (30b), on the usual interpretation where three has WIDE SCOPE and two has
NARROW SCOPE. That is, three has two IN ITS SCOPE. In terms of our analysis, a
quantifier Qi has another quantifier Q2 in its scope when Q2 is part of a type de-
scription ascribed to the set quantified by Qi (Langacker 1991:3.3). In (30b), the
quantifier two is incorporated as part of the type description BOY LIFTED TWO
CHAIRS, and an instance of this process type is ascribed to each member of the
set three boys.
This analysis is diagrammed in Figure 1 1 . The type plane makes reference to
the process type BOY LIFTED TWO CHAIRS. At this level, the boy and the chairs
are only virtual — no particular boy is singled out, nor any particular chairs. Three
instances of this process type are however found in actuality, as well as three
boys, each of whom carries out an instance of the process. Looking at (30b), we
find that different portions of this sentence refer directly to entities found in dif-
ferent planes. The subject three hoys pertains to actuality: it is only at this level
that multiple boys are found. By contrast, the predicate lifted two chairs pertains
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to the type level. It is only at this level that the number of chairs involved is two
— in the actual plane, it can be as many as six. Although the sentence does per-
tain to actual events affecting up to six actual chairs, those events and those
chairs are not mentioned directly. They are introduced only indirectly, via a type
description and the ascription of an instance of that type to each member of a set
of three actual boys.
Actual /
Plane /
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At this point I have no definite idea of how far it is useful to push the notion
of fictivity. In any case I do not expect to find any clear-cut delimitation. It is
more important to work on characterizing each phenomenon in its own terms,
with as much precision and detail as possible. We can then hope to isolate an op-
timal set of descriptive notions, which will make it evident to what extent and in
what specific ways the various phenomena are related to one another.
Should we go all the way and say that everything is fictive? Since our entire
conceptual world is in some sense a mental construction, should we not just admit
that the only kind of reality we have access to is VIRTUAL REALITY? I will leave
that to philosophers. From the linguistic standpoint, however, the question is not
very interesting. Even if we answer in the affirmative, and say that our entire men-
tal world is fictive at some level, it remains true that various aspects of it are fictive
in different ways and to different degrees. We still face the problem of sorting all
this out, of characterizing the full spectrum of situations: those we naively accept
as being real, those we explicitly acknowledge as being imaginary, those involv-
ing virtual entities not necessarily recognized as such, and so on.
I want to conclude by emphasizing that cognitive linguists firmly believe in
reality, however much they talk about mental constructs and fictive entities. Its
basic philosophical stance is EXPERIENTIAL REALISM (Lakoff & Johnson 1980;
Lakoff 1987), and one of its central notions is EMBODIMENT (Johnson 1987).
There IS a real world. Unavoidably, we inhabit it. As a species, we have EVOLVED
to cope with it successfully. As individuals, we DEVELOP to cope with it success-
fully. Our existence and interaction with the world is grounded in our bodies. Our
brains are physical organs embedded in our bodies, and our minds reside in the
activity of our brains. All facets of the mental worlds we construct derive ulti-
mately from our embodied experience as physical creatures in the real world. A
primary goal of cognitive linguistics is to spell out the details of how this hap-
pens.
I therefore have no intention of denying the existence of reality or the
foundational nature of real world experience. It makes no sense to speak of vir-
tual entities except in relation to the actual entities of which they are fictive coun-
terparts. It is nevertheless essential to arrive at an accurate evaluation of the role
played by virtual entities in thought and language. I have argued that their role is
far more extensive and important than is usually recognized. The view of lan-
guage stated in ( 1) is to some extent fictitious and needs to be replaced by a more
balanced and realistic assessment.
NOTES
This paper first appeared in Shin Ja Hwang and Arle Lommel (eds.), LACUS Fo-
rum XXV. It is reprinted with permission.
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